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Since China joined the WTO in 2001, the pressure for bank reforms has mounted as China 
ought to fully open up its financial market to foreign competition by 2006. Efficiency is key for 
domestic banks to survive in a liberalised environment, but it appears that the last hope for 
raising bank efficiency is through ownership reform. Whether ownership reform and foreign 
competition can solve China’s banking problem remains to be tested. This paper aims to answer 
this question through using a non-parametric approach to analyse the efficiency changes of 15 
large commercial banks during 1998-2005. We find that ownership reform and foreign 
competition have forced the Chinese commercial banks to improve performance, as their total 
factor productivity rose by 5.6 per cent per annum. This coincides with the recent bullish 
Chinese stock markets led by three listed state-owned commercial banks. Despite such 
encouraging results, we remain cautious about the future of the Chinese banks, as the good 
results may have been artificially created with massive government support and the 
fundamentals of the banks may be still weak. 
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1 Introduction 
State-owned commercial banks in China have been renowned for their low efficiency, 
mounting non-performing loans (NPLs) and loss making. China’s bank reforms have 
lagged far behind reforms in the real economic sectors for two reasons. First, the 
banking industry has been overwhelmingly dominated by state ownership and enjoyed 
immense monopolistic power. Second, state commercial banks have enjoyed a 
significant leverage of soft budget constraint because they are frequently entrusted or 
coerced by local authorities to provide policy lending, or to help rescue insolvent state-
owned industrial enterprises.  
Aggressive banking reforms started from the late 1980s, initially to separate policy 
lending from commercial operations by establishing three state policy banks and then 
stripping off the NPLs from the largest state-owned commercial banks, including Bank 
of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), or the Big Four hereafter, using four 
newly created state asset management companies. The latest reforms since China joined 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001 have been the result of both 
internal and external pressures. Internal pressure arises because of fierce competition 
from regional and private banking institutions, while external pressure comes from the 
free entry of foreign banks into the Chinese market. 
But how have state commercial banks reacted to these new pressures for reform? 
Answering this question requires a comprehensive analysis of the change of efficiency 
and productivity of these banks in recent years. There are potentially many ways to 
evaluate bank efficiency. The two most frequently used methodologies are the 
stochastic production function approach and the data envelopment analysis, or DEA, 
approach. As the former requires a specific functional form, it may not be suitable for 
the data period when the banking industry in China had undergone dramatic changes. 
Hence, we use the latter approach which is not subject to such a problem. This paper is 
probably the first attempt in the literature to evaluate the technical efficiency of Chinese 
commercial banks using DEA to analyse the efficiency levels of these banks over the 
period 1998-2005, which covers both the pre-WTO and the first few years of the post-
WTO era in China. In addition, a Malmquist index is calculated and decomposed to 
evaluate how Chinese commercial banks have improved their productivity through 
reform and adoption of new technologies in order to face up to the immense competition 
ahead of them by 2006, the last year when China had to fully open up its financial 
market to foreign banks.  
This paper will focus on the efficiency issue in order to evaluate whether Chinese state 
commercial banks have reacted positively and successfully to the new reforms and 
challenges. It uses data from all national commercial banks, state and non-state owned, 
domestic and foreign-invested, over the period 1998-2005. It employs the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) approach to measure the efficiency scores of banks and 
then conducts a Malmquist index analysis to study the evolution of productivity 
changes. The DEA results show that the Big Four are not necessarily less efficient than 
their joint equity counterparts. In fact, two state-owned banks, CCB and BOC,   2
continuously outperform their state-owned peers and most joint equity banks.
1 
However, joint equity banks have a significant advantage over state-owned banks in 
terms of asset quality. The Malmquist index analysis indicates that the average 
productivity of all Chinese banks rose 5.6 per cent per annum over the data period. The 
productivity growth was almost equally explained by efficiency improvement and 
technological progress. Much of the productivity growth of the state-owned commercial 
banks was due to efficiency improvement and little due to technological progress. In 
contrast, much of the productivity growth of the joint-equity commercial banks was due 
to technological progress and little due to efficiency improvement. Such empirical 
results have interesting and important policy implications because they imply that 
government policies should be designed differently to improve the performance of 
different banks. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the reform and 
current structure of China’s banking industry. Section 3 reviews the recent efficiency 
studies in the banking sector and introduces the DEA methodology. Section 4 evaluates 
the efficiency of 15 Chinese national commercial banks and provides a number of 
managerial implications by analysing the DEA results. The productivity change in 
Chinese national commercial banks is investigated in Section 5. Section 6 concludes 
with policy implications. 
2  Reforms in China’s banking industry  
Before economic reforms, China had only one large bank, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC), which had absolute monopoly power in all banking activities. The reform of 
China’s banking industry started in 1979. By 1992, four state-owned commercial banks 
and a number of joint equity banks were established. This led the PBC to focus on its 
role as central bank. In 1994, three policy banks were set up to take over policy banking 
activities, enabling the state-owned commercial banks to focus on commercial 
operations. The promulgation of the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law 
in 1995 and 1996 strengthened the authority of PBC and provided commercial banks a 
legal framework for operation. In 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), was established to take over the supervisory function from PBC. By 2004, 
apart from the Big Four, China had twelve national joint stock banks, 111 city 
commercial banks, three rural commercial banks, 35,544 rural credit cooperatives, and 
204 foreign bank subsidiaries.
2 The structure of the Chinese banking sector at the end of 
2005 is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, only the abbreviations of the full names of banks will be used for simplicity of 
presentation. The full names of these abbreviations are provided in Appendix 1. 
2 In this paper, we only consider the big four state-owned commercial banks and the 11 national joint 
equity banks. The city commercial banks, rural commercial banks, rural credit cooperatives and foreign 
bank subsidiaries are not included because they are either too small, or do not have consistent data for 
analysis. The 15 national commercial banks included in this paper, however, accounted for more than 80 
per cent of China’s commercial lending activities and deposits.   3
Figure 1: China banking sector overview, 2005 
 
 
According to the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2005), the market shares of 
four state-owned banks, or the Big Four, account for 60 per cent of total deposits and 57 
per cent of total loans. However, the average ratio of non-performing loans of the Big 
Four was over 30 per cent in the 1990s. The mounting NPL implies that the Big Four 
are effectively insolvent and their continuing survival is supported by the state through a 
soft budget constraint. In order for Chinese commercial banks to compete and survive in 
a liberalised environment, further reforms were imperative. A critical element of 
ownership reform was to restructure the Big Four as well as other commercial banks to 
enable them to be listed in the stock exchanges, subjecting them to monitoring and 
control by shareholders rather than politicians. 
One important condition for the state-owned commercial banks to be listed on the stock 
exchanges was a substantial reduction in the level of NPLs and a significant increase in 
working capital. This required huge state assistance to the Big Four. Starting from 1999, 
there have been three big waves of state support to strip off NPLs from the Big Four and 
inject new capital. The first wave was in 1999 when four state asset management 
companies were set up to accommodate 1.4 trillion RMB of NPLs, equivalent to almost 
20 per cent of China’s GDP in the same year. The second wave of support came in 2003 
and 2004, when 475.6 billion RMB of NPLs was stripped off from CCB and BOC. In 
the meantime, the government provided US$22.5 billion, taken from the country’s huge 
foreign exchange reserves, to support these two banks. The final wave of support was in 
2005, when 705 billion RMB of NPLs was stripped off from ICBC, with an additional 
capital injection of US$15 billion and the issuance of US$12.1 billion in subordinated 
debt (Garcia-Herrero et al. 2006). 
The purpose of state support was to make the initial public offerings, IPOs, of CCB, 
BOC and ICBC attractive to investors. In the meantime, the Big Four introduced a strict 
monitoring mechanism to control non-performing loans and reduced their workforce by 
250,000 (The Economist 2006). The first bank of the Big Four to be listed was CCB, 
China banking sector 
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whose IPO in Hong Kong in October 2005 raised US$8 billion. It was followed by 
BOC, which was listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai in May 2006, raising US$11.2 
billion. The IPO of ICBC in October 2006 in Hong Kong and Shanghai raised US$21.9 
billion, setting a new world record, surpassing the IPO record set by Japan’s NTT 
Mobile Communications Network Inc., which raised US$18.4 billion in 1998 (Mitchell 
2006). The extraordinary performance of the Chinese stock markets in 2006 and 2007 
has produced many world-class companies in terms of market value. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange Index increased six fold in two years, so did the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange Index. As a result, the three listed state-owned commercial banks, ICBC, 
BOC and CCB, are now among the top ten largest banks in the world in terms of market 
value.   
Although China’s banking sector was opened to foreign banks in 1981, foreign 
participation was extremely restrictive until December 2001 when China joined the 
WTO. Since 2001, the restriction was gradually relaxed, allowing full access by 11 
December 2006. According to CBRC (2006), the development of foreign banks in 
China has three features: radiating outwards from concentration in the Yangtze, Pearl 
and Bohai Rim economic circles; expanding rapidly, with market share increasing; and 
providing more than 100 kinds of business services in twelve business categories. The 
most active foreign bank in China is HSBC, which has significant investments in the 
CBC (US$1.75 billion, or 19.9 per cent of the total equity) and some regional city 
commercial banks. The Royal Bank of Scotland has bought 4.37 per cent of the total 
share equity of BOC. Most other foreign investors, including the Asian Development 
Bank, International Financial Corporation, CitiBank, Hang Seng Bank, Newbridge Asia 
and Commonwealth Bank of Australia have focused their investments in the regional 
city commercial banks. 
Ownership reform and foreign investments have provided significant impetus for the 
Chinese domestic commercial banks to improve their performance through 
restructuring, strict control and monitoring of lending activities and the reform of 
corporate governance. By 2006, foreign banks and their subsidiaries had no business or 
geographical restriction to serve Chinese customers. It is urgent for domestic 
commercial banks to improve efficiency to survive in a more competitive market. 
3  Banking efficiency literature and DEA methodology 
Since the 1990s, numerous studies have focused on measuring the efficiency of 
commercial banks. Berger and Humphrey (1997) document 130 studies on financial 
institutions’ efficiency, using data from 21 countries, from various types of institutions 
including banks, bank branches, savings and loan institutions, credit unions and 
insurance companies. Richard et al. (2002) use a constrained multiplier, input-oriented, 
DEA model to evaluate the production efficiency of US commercial banks during 1984-
98. They found a strong and consistent relationship between efficiency and independent 
measures of performance. Pastor (1999) proposes a new sequential DEA procedure for 
Spanish banks to break down the main indicator of banking risk-provision for loan 
losses into internal and external components. Girardone et al. (2004) investigate the 
main determinants of Italian banks’ cost efficiency over the period 1993-96. They find 
that X-inefficiencies tend to decline over time for all bank sizes. The inclusion of risk 
and output quality variables in the cost function reduces the significance of the scale 
economy estimates.   5
The efficiency of banks in Taiwan and Hong Kong has also attracted strong academic 
interests. Chen and Yeh (2000) adopt the intermediation approach in the DEA model 
where deposits are treated as an input since a bank’s main business is to borrow funds 
from depositors and then lend to others. The approach specifies three outputs: the 
provision of loan services; portfolio investment; and non-interest income and three 
inputs: bank staff; assets; and deposits. They also note that the increase in staff salaries 
and market competition may result in the difficulty in improving technical efficiency. 
Drake et al. (2003) use Hong Kong banking data to examine the macroeconomic and 
regulatory factors that influence bank efficiency. In the Tobit regression, external 
factors such as GDP and government expenditures are tested instead of firm 
characteristics.  
Few studies have been found to address the efficiency issues of China’s banking 
industry in the English language. Fu and Heffernan (2005) measure concentration, 
market share, X-efficiency and scale efficiency of Chinese banks to test both the market 
power and the efficient structure hypotheses. Their results show that during the first 
phase of reform, large state banks exercising market power as major loan providers 
were subsidised by the government. During the second phase of reform, state bank 
subsidies were cut, allowing the relatively more X-efficient joint stock banks to earn 
higher profits although they were less scale efficient. Chen et al. (2005) examine the 
cost, technical and allocative efficiency of 43 Chinese banks during 1993-2000. The 
results show that large state-owned banks and small banks are more efficient than 
medium sized banks. The financial deregulation in 1995 was found to have improved 
both technical and allocative efficiency. There is also evidence of continuous 
dominance of technical efficiency over allocative efficiency, implying that Chinese 
banks need to improve their ability to minimise cost through input combinations. Yao 
et al. (2006) employ a stochastic production frontier function to investigate the effects 
of ownership structure and hard budget constraint on technical efficiency of Chinese 
domestic banks. They find that non-state banks are 8 to 18 per cent more efficient than 
state banks and banks facing a harder budget tend to perform better than those heavily 
capitalised by the state or regional governments. 
Technical efficiency is measuring how well inputs are converted into outputs during a 
specific production process. It is stated as ‘the ratio of weighted sum of outputs to 
weighted sum of inputs’. DEA was originally developed for efficiency measurement in 
an input-output setting based on the concept of Pareto optimum (Charnes et al. 1978). 
What is produced is an ‘efficiency frontier’ made up of those DMUs (decision making 
units) that are efficient relative to the other units under evaluation. The frontier consists 
of the ‘best’ units in the evaluation set and represents a linear combination of 
empirically derived maximum output per given input. Each DMU is assigned an 
efficiency rating based on its position relative to the frontier. The efficient units, those 
making best use of resources, are rated as being 100 per cent efficient whilst the 
inefficient ones obtain lower scores. 
This paper uses a production boundary based linear programming model which is 
referred to as the envelopment model. Mathematical proof of equivalence of efficiency 
rating to Pareto Efficiency concept can be found in Thanassoulis (2001). The technical 
input efficiency of DMU k (decision making unit k, or bank k in our case) is a solution 
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ik x  and  jk y  denote the level of the ith input and jth output observed at DMU k. Any 
feasible set of λ values in model 1 identifies a point within the production possibility set 
which can be constructed from DMU k (k = 1,2,…,n). S
– is defined as the input excesses 
and S
+ the output excesses. ε is a non-archimedean infinitesimal. DMU k is technically 
efficient if and only if 
* 1 k E = ,  0 i S
− =  and 0 j S
+ = . The envelopment model is a 
straightforward linear programming and λ values provide information about efficient 
peers in the reference sets. 
In this paper, we will measure three types of efficiency scores: constant return to scale 
(CRS); variable return to scale (VRS); and scale efficiency. The CRS efficiency score 
draws from the assumption of constant returns to scale and represents technical 
efficiency which measures inefficiencies due to the input/output configuration as well as 
the size of operation. The VRS efficiency score is based on the assumption of variable 
return to scale and represents pure technical efficiency. Scale efficiency can be 
calculated by dividing pure technical efficiency into technical efficiency. To assess the 





= = ∑ . In the following section, we first use a CRS input-
oriented envelopment model to assess the technical efficiency of Chinese national 
commercial banks and then construct an output-oriented Malmquist index to examine 
the productivity growth in China’s banking industry.  
4  Efficiency analysis of Chinese commercial banks 
4.1  Efficiency scores and ranks 
Interest income and non-interest income have been widely recognised as outputs of 
commercial banks. However, there is a debate about whether deposits should be treated 
as an input or output. We do not agree that banks use deposits to produce loans. 
Deposits are intermediate substance which helps banks achieve interest income and 
non-interest income through banking services. The input is not the deposit itself but the 
resources that are used to generate the deposit, e.g., the interest expenses and labour 
cost. As such, the inputs should contain interest expenses and non-interest expenses 
such as salary cost. During the process of transferring deposits to loans, banks will 
inevitably incur some impaired loans. Banking in this sense is a sort of risk business. 
Impaired loans are a cost that banks have to bear and can be dealt with as a resource to 
gain interest yields from gross loans. The ratio of impaired loans, or non-performing 
loans, to gross loans is included in this study as the third input variable, taking the asset 
quality into account. Obviously, given the output levels, the lower the ratio, the higher 
the efficiency of the banks.   7
























ICBC 224.5 86.6 2.59  13.2 57.9  0.23  4.5 
ABC 128.4  61.4 2.09  8.6  53.2 0.16 23.5 
CCB 173.6  57.1 3.04  11.7 49.4  0.24  3.9 
BOC 167.9 66.9 2.51  21.3 49.3  0.43  9.6 
CBC 49.7  18.1  2.75  7.8 14.7  0.53  2.4 
CMB 26.0 9.3 2.80  1.2  7.1 0.17 2.5 
CITIC 22.0  9.6 2.29  0.7  5.9 0.12 5.6 
CEB* 16.1  8.1 1.99  0.5  5.0 0.10 5.0 
PDB 22.3 8.7 2.56  0.6  5.5 0.11 2.2 
CMSB 23.6 11.0 2.15  0.5  5.9 0.08 1.4 
GDB* 13.2  7.8 1.69  0.6 4.7  0.13  12.5 
FIB 17.2  7.9  2.18  0.3  3.8 0.08 2.2 
HXB 13.3 6.0 2.22  0.3  3.4 0.09 3.0 
BOS 8.2 3.1  2.65  0.6  2.1 0.29 2.5 
SDB 9.1 3.8  2.39  0.4 2.5  0.16  10.6 
Average 61.0  24.4  2.50 4.6  18.0  0.25  6.1 
Sources: Bankscope. 
 
Table 1 describes the input and output levels of the 15 largest Chinese national 
commercial banks in 2005. The data for efficiency analysis consists of all 15 banks over 
1998-2005. The data is extracted from Bankscope. The first column lists the banks’ 
abbreviated name, the full names are given in Appendix, followed by columns 
containing information about interest incomes, interest expenses, non-interest incomes, 
non-interest expenses and the ratio of NPLs to gross loans for each bank. Only the Big 
Four achieve interest incomes greater than 100 billion RMB. In terms of interest 
incomes, the biggest state bank is ICBC while the biggest joint equity bank is CBC. The 
interest income gap between them is 174.5 billion RMB. However, when interest 
expenses are considered, the Big Four do not seem to perform much better than joint 
equity banks. CCB has the highest ratio at 3.04 of interest incomes to interest expenses 
and the runner up is CMB with a ratio of 2.80. With respect to the ratio of non-interest 
incomes to non-interest expenses, state owned banks outperform joint equity banks. 
Three of the Big Four, BOC, CCB and ICBC, have a ratio greater than 0.2, and only two 
of the joint equity banks, CBC and BOS, have a ratio above 0.2. Because different 
indicators provide mixed information, it is important to use a ‘compound’ single index 
to fully evaluate bank performance. The best candidate for the compound single index is 
efficiency scores. 
Table 2 presents the estimated CRS input-oriented efficiency scores for the 15 
commercial banks in 1998-2005. The software is DEA Excel Solver developed by Joe 
Zhu (2003). The average efficiency score of Chinese state-owned commercial banks 
over the data period is 0.85. It demonstrates that many banks are producing close to the 
frontier, which is led by BOC and CCB. In other words, the efficiency levels of the   8
sample banks are very close to each other. There are two possible explanations for the 
results. First, the data include only the national banks which have similar characteristics 
in terms of inputs and outputs. Second, in the data period, the banking system was 
highly competitive as inefficient banks have to emulate efficient banks quickly in order 
to avoid being taken over or forced out of business. For whatever explanation, the 
relatively high level of average efficiency scores implies that Chinese banks were trying 
to improve their competitiveness prior to and after WTO accession. This is reflected by 
the small but obvious improvement in the average efficiency scores over the data 
period. The industrial average efficiency scores rose from 0.78 in 1999 to 0.91 by 2005. 
Three banks, CCB, BOC and CBC, are identified as the most technically efficient as 
their average efficiency scores are equal or close to unity. Of the Big Four, CCB, BOC 
and ICBC are among the most efficient banks but ABC is the second most inefficient in 
the sample. This explains why the government has allowed the former three to be listed 
on the stock markets but kept ABC in its present form. The finding that CCB, BOC and 
ICBC are among the most efficient commercial banks in China contradicts a common 
perception and the results of some previous studies. The relative understatement of the 
state-owned commercial banks in China by some other studies may have been due to 
their modelling method. If deposit is included as an input, the stock of deposits in the 
Big Four is much bigger than those in the joint equity banks, leading to a low efficiency 
rating of the Big Four. However, the expenses of maintaining the deposits by the Big 
Four are low. If deposit is excluded from the model as has been done in this paper, the 
efficiency rating of the Big Four is improved. 
 
Table 2: Efficiency scores and ranking of Chinese commercial banks: 1998-2005 
Bank  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Average  Rank 
ICBC  1.00  0.98  0.92  0.83  0.84  0.91  0.98  1.00  0.93  3 
ABC  0.74  0.68  0.67  0.68  0.75  0.77  0.77  0.73  0.72  14 
CCB  0.95  0.87  0.79  0.84  0.99  0.99  1.00  1.00  0.93  4 
BOC  1.00  0.78  1.00  1.00  0.91  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.96  1 
CBC  0.61  0.78  0.82  0.80  0.87  0.93  1.00  0.98  0.85  10 
CMB  0.84  0.81  0.80  0.87  0.97  0.99  1.00  0.99  0.91  5 
CITIC  1.00  0.57  0.81  0.79  0.85  0.87  0.91  0.91  0.84  11 
CEB  1.00  0.75  0.78  0.71  0.77  0.82  0.81  0.79  0.81  13 
PDB  0.76  0.78  0.78  0.79  0.96  0.99  1.00  0.99  0.88  9 
CMB  0.81  0.85  0.85  0.89  0.85  0.97  1.00  0.97  0.90  6 
GDB  0.59  0.61  0.64  0.68  0.67  0.64  0.64  0.66  0.64  15 
FIB  0.79  0.87  0.86  0.88  0.93  0.83  0.96  0.97  0.89  7 
HXB  0.82  0.81  0.92  0.86  0.87  0.92  0.92  0.93  0.88  8 
BOS  0.93  0.84  1.00  0.93  1.00  0.89  0.99  0.92  0.94  2 
SDB  1.00  0.74  0.86  0.82  0.84  0.78  0.84  0.82  0.84  12 
Average  0.86  0.78  0.83  0.82  0.87  0.89  0.92  0.91  0.85   
Sources: Data are taken from Bankscope. 
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The most inefficient joint equity bank is GDB, justifying why the government has been 
negotiating with Citigroup and Société Générale to buy 85 per cent of GDB’s share 
capital. China has been reluctant to allow any foreign bank to have a controlling stake in 
any Chinese bank. However, there are exceptional cases if foreign participation can 
fundamentally transform the performance of a local bank and provide valuable 
experiences for the reforms of others by introducing the best foreign managerial 
practices and corporate governance. One such exceptional case was the San Francisco-
based capital fund Newbridge that was allowed to become the largest and controlling 
shareholder of SDB through the procurement of 17.8 per cent stake worth US$145 
million from its four government shareholders in May 2004 (Dong 2005). 
4.2 Slacks  and  targets 
As for input-efficiency, an efficiency score equal to one means that efficient banks lie 
on the boundary and their input levels cannot be radically reduced for a given output 
level. DEA results not only help managers to identify best practice in the sector, but also 
point to the direction and magnitude that inefficient banks can improve. In 2005, for 
example, CEB had an efficiency score of 0.79, which means that the maximum radial 
contraction (0.21) is possible to the input level without reducing its output. According to 
the DEA model, the input and output slacks must be taken into account. As a result, the 
target for efficiency improvement will be the sum of radial reduction and the existing 
slack. Take CEB as an example, the target ratio of NPLs/gross loans will be 
(0.05*0.79)–0.028=0.011. 
After knowing the targets of efficiency improvement, inefficient banks need to find out 
the most feasible way to catch up. It is crucial that the process of efficiency 
improvement should be made in a short time period. The efficiency theory suggests that 
it is always good to learn from the efficient peers with the same or similar input-output 
mix. The reference set offers inefficient banks a feasible means to emulate their efficient 
peers by learning from their practice. 
Taking CEB in 2005 as an example, CMB and PDB are identified as its efficient peers 
in the reference set as their corresponding  0.296 λ =  and  0.498 λ =  are the only 
positive values at the optimal solution to the envelopment model. Compared with CEB, 
PDB has less non-interest expenses and a lower NPL/gross loan ratio but more interest 
and non-interest incomes. Although PDB has 3 per cent more interest expenses than 
CEB, the former earns 17.5 per cent more interest incomes than the latter. If we scale 
down PDB and CMB by 0.498 and 0.296 respectively, the combination of scaled down 
input levels of PDB and CMB offers the same interest income as CEB could deliver but 
it uses only 87 per cent of the inputs used by CEB. This underlies the Pareto-efficiency 
rating of CEB at 0.87. PDB and CMB are thus regarded as the efficient benchmarks for 
CEB in 2005. It requires high managerial skills within inefficient banks to study their 
efficient peers’ practices and set up targets in relation to the combination of input and 
output levels of their efficient benchmarks. 
Among state banks, CCB and BOC are most frequently referenced. Another efficient 
state bank, ICBC, has never been referenced. In this sense, CCB and BOC should be 
regarded as the efficient benchmarks for the inefficient state bank ABC. The empirical 
results provide a strong theoretical backing for the government’s decision on the order 
of priority of restructuring CCB, BOC and ICBC of the Big Four. PDB and BOS are 
often quoted in the reference sets of joint equity banks although their average efficiency   10
scores are not the highest among joint equity banks. One possible explanation for their 
frequent appearance in the reference sets is that their operating practices and 
environment match more closely with the less efficient joint equity banks than the other 
more efficient counterparts. 
4.3  Scale type and scale efficiency 
In theory, an efficient bank must produce at constant returns to scale. At an IRS, 
increasing return to scale, production point the firm raising its input levels by a small 
percentage will lead to an expansion of its output by a higher percentage. At a DRS, 
decreasing return to scale, production point a small expansion of output requires a larger 
percentage increase in inputs. Obviously, when IRS holds a bank should increase its 
scale size. Similarly, when DRS holds a bank should reduce its operation. The ideal 
scale size is where CRS holds.  
It is striking to note that inefficient state banks in most years exhibit DRS while 
inefficient joint equity banks show IRS. The empirical results provide valuable 
information for policy makers to justify their capital injection initiatives and business 
expansion regulations. It is interesting to deduce that the reason why non-state 
ownership in joint equity banks has not brought about superior performance over their 
state-owned and bigger counterparts is clearly due to the lack of scale economies. To 
improve the overall performance of the Chinese banking industry will require not only 
ownership reform but also a consolidation of operation to exploit the economies of scale 
in the non-state sector. 
By controlling for the scale effect, joint equity banks become relatively more efficient 
than their state-owned counterparts. In particular, CMB, HXB and BOS improve their 
efficiency and ranking dramatically, implying that joint equity banks should be 
encouraged to expand their branch networks in order to improve their competitiveness 
and overall efficiency of the entire banking industry in China. Scale inefficiency is the 
biggest source of the overall technical inefficiency of joint equity banks.
3 
4.4  Correlation between firm size, efficiency ranking and profitability ranking 
It is interesting to investigate the relationship between efficiency and profitability 
rankings of commercial banks. Studies such as Berger and Mester (1997) find that firm 
size is a possible factor that influences efficiency and profitability of commercial banks. 
The profitability in this study is measured as the ratio of pre-tax profit over total assets. 
The results show that there is no evidence of any strong correlation between the 
rankings of efficiency scores, profitability and firm size, implying that firm size is not 
an important factor for efficiency and profitability. Because profitability is measured as 
the ratio of pre-tax profit over total assets, it effectively measures the accumulated 
historical performance of banks, instead of their current operating performance. In this 
sense, a DEA efficiency score is a better measurement of firm performance than 
profitability. 
                                                 
3 The detailed decomposed results relating to the economies of scale are not reported here to save space 
but are available on request.   11
There is also no evidence that joint equity banks outperform state owned banks. CCB 
and BOC enjoy high rankings based on both efficiency and profitability indices. Similar 
results are obtained in other years. Our finding is in accordance with the conclusions 
reached in recent research by Bonin et al. (2005) but contradicts some other studies that 
are based on a different research methodology (Yao et al. 2006). With respect to the 
impact of ownership, privatisation or a joint equity arrangement is not sufficient 
condition to increase a bank’s efficiency as state-owned banks are not appreciably less 
efficient than private or joint equity banks in as far as our sample is concerned. 
However, it is found that efficient commercial banks, whether they are state-owned or 
of joint equity, happened to be those that have been listed in the stock markets recently 
while the inefficient banks have not been allowed to be listed.  
5 Malmquist  index 
The Malmquist index has been frequently used to measure productivity changes in 
various industries. The advantage of the Malmquist index as opposed to other 
alternative measurements is that productivity change can be decomposed into efficiency 
improvement and technological progress. The first empirical study relating to the 
Malmquist index in a DEA context is Färe et al. (1989). The Malmquist index captures 
productivity change in terms of quantities without reference to input prices or output 
values. As the Malmquist index is always computed maintaining a constant returns to 
scale assumption, its value is the same whether it is computed in an input or output 
orientation (Thanassoulis 2001). Hence, the output orientation efficiency scores are used 
to conduct the Malmquist index to fit the interpretation of productivity change.
4  
Calculation of the Malmquist index and its decomposition can be done on an annual 
basis for individual banks or for a given data period. To save space, the detailed 
calculations on an annual or periodic basis are not presented here. Table 3 only presents 
the geometric average annual growth rates of total factor productivity (TFP), measured 
by the Malquist index in column 2, and the geometric average annual growth rates of 
technical efficiency, in column 3, and the geometric average annual growth rates of 
technological progress. 
Except for CITIC, CEB and SDB, all the banks achieved significant TFP growth over 
the data period. The star performer is CCB, which becomes a benchmark for other state 
banks. Over the data period, CCB achieves an average annual growth of more than 15 
per cent in TFP. Among the joint equity banks, CBC, CMB and PDB outperform their 
peers. They achieve an annual productivity growth of 7.5 per cent or more. In contrast, 
CITIC, CEB and SDB experience serious deterioration in their productivity, with a 




                                                 
4 The specification of Malmquist index can be found in Thanassoulis (2001).   12
Table 3: Decomposition of productivity, geometric average annual growth, 1998-2005 
 Malmquist  Efficiency  Technical 
Banks  index (%)  growth (%)  change (%) 
ICBC  4.20 1.83 2.33 
ABC  7.10 5.96 1.07 
CCB  15.70 15.51 0.15 
BOC  10.50 10.50 0.00 
CBC  11.20 11.12 0.07 
CMB  5.50 3.78 1.65 
CITIC  -4.10 -5.54 1.52 
CEB  -5.10 -7.89 3.03 
PDB  7.60 3.10 4.37 
CMSB  8.60 5.20 3.23 
GDB 0.30  -4.63  5.17 
FIB  4.60 0.49 4.09 
HXB 2.60  -3.46  6.28 
BOS 0.40  -3.55  4.09 
SDB  -3.20 -4.41 1.27 
Mean  5.60 2.88 2.64 
Notes:  Malmquist index indicates geometric average annual growth of total factor productivity 
decomposed into efficiency growth and technological change, i.e., Malmquist index = efficiency 
growth * technical change. 
Sources: Data are from Bankscope. 
 
On average, Chinese national commercial banks achieved remarkable growth in TFP. 
The average growth is 5.6 per cent per annum pulling 15 banks together over the entire 
data period. The average growth rate after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 was 
more than ten per cent per year, much higher than the average growth prior to the WTO 
accession. This implies that WTO accession has been a powerful impetus for reforms in 
China to improve bank efficiency. 
The Malmquist index can be decomposed into efficiency changes and technological 
progress, or frontier shift. As shown in column 3 of Table 3, the average industrial 
technical efficiency change is 2.88 per cent per annum, which accounts for more than 
half the TFP growth. CCB and BOC are the best performers in terms of efficiency 
growth, as both achieve double-digit annual growth in the data period. The contribution 
of technological progress to TFP is presented in the last column in Table 3. The average 
annual growth is 2.64 per cent for all the banks over the whole data period. It is striking 
to find that all the banks achieve positive technological growth, and the best performers 
are not the Big Four state-owned banks but the joint equity banks, such as HXB, BOS, 
PDB and CEB. 
The decomposition results in Table 3 have important policy implications. First, the 
Chinese banking industry has become considerably more competitive in recent years, 
especially after the WTO accession, although state-owned banks still enjoy some 
encapsulated market power, as well as government protection and financial support. 
Second, the growth of TFP is almost equally explained by its two components:   13
efficiency improvement and technological progress. Third, large state-owned banks 
make more progress in improving their technical efficiency than their joint equity 
counterparts, but the latter achieve more technological progress than the former. One 
possible explanation for the significant improvement in TFP growth, especially for CCB 
and BOC, are due to their efforts to retrench employment, to implement a stricter 
monitoring and control mechanism on lending and to improve management and 
corporate governance. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper uses the latest banking data to assess the efficiency of Chinese national 
commercial banks. It is the first attempt to use the resource approach to identify inputs 
and outputs in the banking context with reference to asset quality. One key finding is 
that Chinese national commercial banks do not have substantial differences in technical 
efficiencies as the average scores of efficiency are high and the aggregate gaps in 
technical efficiency are low at only 15 per cent. Another important finding is that the 
TFP of the sample banks rose significantly by 5.6 per cent per annum over the data 
period. These empirical results show clear evidence that Chinese national commercial 
banks have reacted positively and aggressively to ownership reform and foreign 
competition.  
Three large state-owned banks, CCB, BOC and ICBC dominate the market as they have 
high technical efficiency and profitability, explaining why their IPOs in 2005 and 2006 
were so heavily demanded by investors. Despite the improvement in efficiency, 
productivity and the success of transformation into shareholding companies, it has to be 
pointed out that the results of bank reform in China in the last few years may have been 
artificially created, or at least supported, by the government. On the other hand, the 
empirical results in this paper provide some useful additional insights into the Chinese 
commercial banking industry. They contradict a perceived conception that Chinese 
state-owned banks cannot withstand the onslaught of foreign banks entering into China 
after WTO accession. The successful IPOs of CCB, BOC and ICBC indicate that the 
government has achieved its first goal of ownership reform with foreign competition 
after WTO accession, which is to transfer the Big Four from state-owned banks into 
shareholding companies. Anecdotal evidence and observation over the past two years 
show that Chinese commercial banks have made significant progress in improving their 
efficiency and corporate governance. Apart from reducing the number of employees, the 
Big Four have improved their lending strategies and tried to steer away from 
intervention by local governments. Some commercial banks have tried to form strategic 
alliances with foreign commercial banks by allowing their investments in an effort to 
learn from their advanced managerial and organisational experiences.  
This paper shows some strong and unambiguous results that CCB and BOC have 
emerged to be China’s best performing commercial banks, even better than many of the 
joint-equity banks. Although it is too early to predict whether the Big Four will compete 
successfully with foreign banks and establish themselves as world class commercial 
financial institutions, the fact that the Chinese commercial banks in general and the 
CCB, BOC and ICBC in particular, have achieved admirable productivity growth 
implies that the most recent banking reforms in China have produced some encouraging 
results.    14
The empirical results in this paper also indicate that the Big Four, except for ABC, were 
able to improve TFP mainly through improving technical efficiency, instead of 
technological progress. In contrast, the joint equity banks have improved their 
productivity mainly through technological progress rather than efficiency improvement. 
In addition, they appear to have suffered from the lack of scale economies because they 
do not have a large network of branches as do their larger state-owned counterparts. In 
other words, joint equity banks have not been able to exploit their ownership advantage 
over the Big Four because they are not big enough. Joint equity banks were initially 
established by regional governments with the clear objective of serving the local 
market. Although they have expanded their services throughout the country, they are 
still locally controlled and do not have the ability to become truly national, let alone 
international, through exploiting the economies of scale and scope. Future bank reforms 
in China may go in the following directions. First, the Big Four should change their 
ownership structure to become truly large commercial banks with minimum 
intervention from central and regional governments. Bank directors should be appointed 
based on professional qualifications and managerial ability instead of party seniority. 
Second, the same reforms in the state sector should also be applied in the joint equity 
sector, but merger and acquisition should be encouraged to enable them to exploit the 
economies of scale and scope.  
Appendix 
Names and abbreviations of national commercial banks in China 
Abbreviations  Full names of banks 
ICBC  Industry and Commercial Bank of China 
ABC  Agricultural Bank of China 
CCB  China Construction Bank 
BOC  Bank of China 
CBC  China Bank of Communications 
CMB  China Merchant Bank 
CITIC  China Investments and Trust Bank 
CEB  China Everbright Bank 
PDB Pudong  Development  Bank 
CMSB  China Mingsheng Bank 
GDB  Guangdong Development Bank 
FIB Fujian  Investment  Bank 
HXB Huaxia  Bank 
BOS  Bank of Shanghai 
SDB Shenzhen  Development  Bank 
Notes: All banks listed in this table are national commercial banks, meaning that they can provide 
banking services throughout the country without any geographical restriction. The state-owned 
commercial banks are the Big Four, ICBC, ABC, CCB and BOC. The others are joint equity banks. These 
15 banks account for over 80 per cent of China’s total commercial lending activities and deposits.   15
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